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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 In this case, we must determine whether the 
Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission ("Commission") is an "arm" or 
"alter ego" of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and thus entitled 
to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court.  
Because we conclude that the Commission is not an arm or alter 
ego of Pennsylvania we will affirm the district court's finding 
that the Commission does not enjoy Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
immunity. 
 I. 
 The appellee, Charles Christy ("Christy"), has been an 
employee of the Commission since 1976.1  In November of 1992, 
Christy made application for the position of Paint Crew Foreman.  
He was interviewed for this position in early 1993 by the 
appellants John Boschi, Vincent Greco and John Stewart.2  Christy 
was then chosen as one of three final candidates for the Paint 
Crew Foreman position.  The names of the three final candidates 
were passed to the Commission's personnel committee for final 
                     
1
.   Since 1983, Christy has been employed as an Auto 
Mechanic 1. 
2
.   John Boschi is currently the Commission's Deputy Executive 
Director of Maintenance; Vincent Greco is Eastern Division 
Superintendent of the Commission; and John Stewart is Assistant 
Deputy Executive Director of Maintenance for the Commission.  The 
other individual defendant in this appeal, Robert Brady, is a 
Turnpike Commissioner. 
  
review.  The personnel committee then recommended that the 
position be awarded to one Sean Pilecki, a Commission employee 
during the preceding four and a half years.  The Commission 
adopted the personnel committee's recommendation and hired Mr. 
Pilecki.  Christy subsequently applied and was turned down for 
the position of Eastern Division Equipment Supervisor. 
 Christy then sued the Commission and its individual 
commissioners and personnel committee members pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, claiming that he was not promoted due 
to political bias against him.  In response to Christy's claims 
of political bias, the Commission and individual defendants 
Brady, Greco and Stewart filed a joint motion for summary 
judgment, while the defendant Boschi filed a separate summary 
judgment motion.  The district court denied the defendants' 
motions, ruling as a matter of law that the Commission was not 
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and rejecting the 
individual defendants' claims of qualified immunity.  These 
appeals followed.  
 II. 
 The district court had jurisdiction in this case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(a)(3) and 1367(a).3  We have 
                     
3
.   The Commission argues that the district court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over it because Christy had elected 
to drop the Commission as a party by the time the district court 
ruled on the Eleventh Amendment issue.  Putting aside the 
question whether or not Christy in fact effectively dropped the 
Commission as a party, the Commission is incorrect in asserting 
that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 
it at the time the court ruled on the Eleventh Amendment issue.  
Christy sued the individual defendants in both their individual 
and official capacities.  A suit against an individual in his or 
  
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over the 
district court's denial of the defendants' motions for summary 
judgment on Eleventh Amendment and qualified immunity grounds.  
See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 
___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S. Ct. 684, 687-89 (1993) (Eleventh 
Amendment immunity); footnote 4, infra (qualified immunity).  We 
exercise plenary review of the district court's denial of the 
defendants' motions for summary judgment.  Rappa v. New Castle 
County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1050 (3d Cir. 1994).4 
(..continued) 
her official capacity is no different from a suit against that 
individual's office.  "As such, it is no different from a suit 
against" the office itself.  Will v. Michigan Dept. of State 
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citations omitted); see also 
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) (emphasizing that 
official capacity suits "`generally represent only another way of 
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an 
agent.'" (citation omitted)).  In this case, a suit against the 
individual defendants in their official capacities is the same as 
a suit against the Commission.  The individual defendants have 
asserted Eleventh Amendment immunity in relation to Christy's 
official capacity claims, and pressed that immunity in their 
summary judgment motions before the district court.  Thus, the 
issue of the Commission's entitlement to sovereign immunity was 
properly before the district court at the time the court ruled on 
the issue.  
4
.   The individual defendants argue that the district court 
erred in denying their motions for summary judgment based on 
qualified immunity.  The plaintiff contends that we lack 
jurisdiction to entertain this argument because the district 
court's decision was based on factual rather than legal grounds.  
We do not agree.  We will not address this question at length, 
however, because it appears likely that the Supreme Court will 
soon resolve this question in Johnson v. Jones, No. 94-455 
(Argued April 18, 1995). 
 
 While we believe that we have jurisdiction to entertain the 
individual defendants' qualified immunity argument, we affirm the 
district court's decision on the merits.  When the disputed facts 
are viewed in the light most favorable to Christy, as they must 
  
 III. 
 We must determine whether the district court correctly 
concluded that the Commission is not an "arm" of Pennsylvania and 
therefore not entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment.5  The question whether the Commission is an "arm" of 
the State is one of federal law.  Blake v. Kline, 612 F.2d 718, 
722 (3d Cir. 1979).  However, before undertaking our Eleventh 
Amendment analysis, we must decide a question of apparent first 
impression in this Circuit:  who bears the burden of production 
and persuasion with respect to factual questions when a putative 
state entity claims immunity under the Eleventh Amendment?  We 
conclude that the party asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity 
(and standing to benefit from its acceptance) bears the burden of 
proving its applicability.  In so concluding, we adopt the 
reasoning set forth by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
in ITSI TV Productions v. Agricultural Associations, 3 F.3d 1289 
(9th Cir. 1993).  Because Eleventh Amendment immunity can be 
expressly waived by a party, or forfeited through non-assertion, 
it does not implicate federal subject matter jurisdiction in the 
(..continued) 
at summary judgment, we agree that the individual defendants were 
not entitled to qualified immunity. 
5
.   The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power 
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit 
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State . . . ."  U.S. Const. 
amend. XI.  Its explicit terms notwithstanding, the Eleventh 
Amendment has consistently been interpreted to immunize an 
unconsenting state  "`from suits brought in federal courts by her 
own citizens as well as by citizens of another state.'"  
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 
(1984) (citation omitted). 
  
ordinary sense.  Id. at 1291.  We agree with the Ninth Circuit 
that "whatever its jurisdictional attributes, [Eleventh Amendment 
immunity] should be treated as an affirmative defense[,]" and 
"[l]ike any other such defense, that which is promised by the 
Eleventh Amendment must be proved by the party that asserts it 
and would benefit from its acceptance."  Id.  We also agree with 
the Ninth Circuit that considerations of fairness support this 
conclusion.  As the court noted in ITSI TV Productions: 
 In general, a claim of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity will occasion serious dispute only 
where a relatively complex institutional 
arrangement makes it unclear whether a given 
entity ought to be treated as an arm of the 
state.  In such cases, the "true facts" as to 
the particulars of this arrangement will 
presumably "lie particularly within the 
knowledge of" the party claiming immunity. 
Id. at 1292 (citations omitted). 
 Having concluded that the party asserting Eleventh 
Amendment immunity bears the burden of proving entitlement to it, 
we turn now to the merits of the immunity question.  We have on 
numerous occasions set forth the criteria to be considered in 
determining whether an entity is an "alter ego" or "arm" of a 
state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.  See e.g., Peters 
v. Delaware River Port Authority, 16 F.3d 1346, 1350 (3d Cir. 
1994); Bolden v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 953 
F.2d 807, 816-818 (3d Cir. 1991) (in banc); Fitchik v. New Jersey 
Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(in banc).  Our oft-reiterated test entails three distinct 
inquiries:  (1) whether, in the event the plaintiff prevails, the 
  
payment of the judgment would come from the state (this includes 
three considerations:  whether the payment will come from the 
state's treasury, whether the agency has sufficient funds to 
satisfy the judgment, and whether the sovereign has immunized 
itself from responsibility for the agency's debts); (2) the 
status of the agency under state law (this includes four 
considerations:  how state law treats the agency generally, 
whether the agency is separately incorporated, whether the agency 
can sue and be sued in its own right, and whether it is immune 
from state taxation); and (3) what degree of autonomy the agency 
enjoys.  Peters v. Del. River Port Authority, 16 F.3d 1346, 1350 
(3d Cir. 1994) (citing Bolden v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 
953 F.2d 807, 816 (3d Cir. 1991) (in banc)).  We turn now to this 
three-pronged inquiry. 
 A.  Funding 
 We have explained that although no single factor is 
dispositive of the Eleventh Amendment inquiry, the "most 
important" factor is whether a judgment against the entity in 
question, in this case the Commission, would be paid out of the 
state treasury.  See, e.g., Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail 
Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1989) (in banc).  
The special emphasis we place upon the funding factor is 
supported by the Eleventh Amendment's central goal:  the 
prevention of federal court judgments that must be paid out of 
the State's treasury.  See Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 659-60 (citing 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)).  The Supreme Court has 
recently reiterated the significance accorded this factor in 
  
relation to other Eleventh Amendment considerations.  In Hess v. 
Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994), 
the Court explained that "prevention of federal court judgments 
that must be paid out of a State's treasury" formed the "impetus" 
for the Eleventh Amendment.  Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 404. 
 Accordingly, Courts of Appeals have 
recognized the vulnerability of the State's 
purse as the most salient factor in Eleventh 
Amendment determinations . . . .  "[T]he vast 
majority of Circuits have concluded that the 
state treasury factor is the most important 
factor to be considered and, in practice, 
have generally accorded this factor 
dispositive weight." 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 1.  Whether Payment Will Come from the State's Treasury 
 Pursuant to the Turnpike Organization, Extension and 
Toll Road Conversion Act ("The Act"), 36 P.S. §§ 651.1 et. seq., 
the Commission is authorized to obtain funds through the 
collection of tolls for the use of the Pennsylvania Turnpike 
System.  36 P.S. § 651.16.  The Commission is also authorized to 
collect rents and charges for telephone and electric lines, gas 
stations, garages, stores, hotels, restaurants and advertising 
signs.  Id.  The Act also authorizes the Commission to obtain 
funds through the issuance of bonds, notes and other obligations.  
Id. at § 651.12.  In addition, the Act authorizes the Commission 
to obtain funds from the federal government.  Id. at § 651.19.  
Finally, the Commission receives some funding out of 
Pennsylvania's oil company franchise tax collections.  75 
Pa.C.S.A. § 9511(h). 
  
 The Commission notes that only one of these funding 
sources -- tolls -- is not subject to state control.  According 
to the Commission, the state's regulation and control of the 
Commission's funding is crucial to our analysis of the funding 
factor.  Also significant, according to the Commission, is the 
fact that upon retiring its debts, or setting aside funds 
sufficient to do so, the Commission is to be dissolved and all of 
the Commission's property is to be vested in the Department of 
Highways.  See 36 P.S. § 652o. 
 We do not know what percentage of the Commission's 
funding might be attributed to each of the funding sources 
identified above.  We are, of course, able to observe that only 
one of the five available sources of funding -- the oil company 
franchise tax -- is obtained from the state.  The other four 
sources -- tolls, rents, bond and note revenues, and federal 
funding -- are not state-derived.  That four of the five 
established sources of the Commission's funding are not state-
derived is, we think, even in the absence of additional 
information, some support for the conclusion that the Commission 
is not the alter ego of Pennsylvania.6 
                     
6
.   Although the figure does not appear in the record, the 
Commission has represented to us that it has received "more than 
$112,000,000" in oil company franchise tax revenues.  (Commission 
brief at 36 n.18).  We fail to see, however, how we can draw any 
conclusion from this representation, given that the Commission 
has failed to provide information regarding the percentage of its 
annual revenues received in this form.  See Bolden, 953 F.2d at 
819-20 (without knowing what percentage of SEPTA's total revenue 
comes from state funds under a particular new law, we held that 
the impact of the law on SEPTA's funding was too uncertain to be 
given significant weight in the funding analysis).   
  
 The degree of state regulation of the Commission's 
funding does not alter our conclusion that the funding factor 
weighs against according immunity to the Commission.  We have 
explained that state control is only significant to the funding 
analysis where such control indicates state ownership of the 
funds.  Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 661.  In other words, state control 
over an entity's ability to obtain funds is inadequate to 
demonstrate state ownership of the funds where the state is not 
shown to have a financial interest that would be directly and 
adversely affected by the diminution of the funds in question.  
See id.  Otherwise, the degree of state control over the entity's 
funding is relevant to the autonomy inquiry, which we discuss 
below.  Id.  Here, the state's control over the Commission's 
authority to issue bonds, notes and other obligations falls short 
of indicating state ownership of the funds obtained through the 
issuance of such bonds, notes and other obligations.  Likewise, 
state control over the Commission's ability to obtain federal 
funding falls short of indicating state ownership of the federal 
funds obtained.  The Commission's evidence of state control over 
its ability to obtain funds simply fails to show a financial 
interest on the part of Pennsylvania that would be directly and 
adversely affected by the diminution of the Commission's funds 
obtained through the issuance of bonds or from the federal 
government. 
 Nor is our conclusion with respect to the funding 
factor altered by the fact that the Commission will one day be 
  
dissolved and all its remaining funds and property vest in the 
Department of Highways.  Pursuant to 36 P.S. § 652o: 
  When all bonds and the interest thereon 
shall have been paid or a sufficient amount 
for the payment of all bonds and the interest 
to maturity thereon, shall have been set 
aside in trust for the benefit of the 
bondholders, and shall continue to be held 
for that purpose, the turnpike and the 
connecting tunnels and bridges shall become a 
part of the system of State highways, and 
shall be maintained by the Department of 
Highways free of tolls, and thereupon the 
commission shall be dissolved, and all funds 
of the commission not required for the 
payment of the bonds and all machinery, 
equipment and other property belonging to the 
commission, shall be vested in the Department 
of Highways. 
36. P.S. § 652o.  Thus, the dissolution of the Commission is 
statutorily contingent upon the Commission satisfying, or being 
able to satisfy, all of its debts and obligations.  If anything, 
this provision provides further support for our conclusion by 
illustrating the state's reluctance to take on the Commission's 
financial obligations as its own. 
 2.  Whether the Commission Could Satisfy a Judgment Against It 
 We do not know how much money the Commission has or 
would have available to it to satisfy a potential judgment 
against it.  According to the Commission, the lack of record 
evidence on this point renders this second funding inquiry 
"irrelevant."  We do not agree.  Since the Commission bears the 
burden of proving its entitlement to Eleventh Amendment immunity, 
the Commission's failure to provide pertinent information 
regarding its ability, or lack thereof, to satisfy a potential 
  
judgment against it simply means that the Commission has failed 
to sustain its burden of proof on this important question.  
Moreover, even in the absence of such evidence, our cases enable 
us to draw certain conclusions, with respect to the Commission's 
ability to pay a judgment against it.  In both Bolden and 
Fitchik, we suggested that an entity with power to raise revenues 
by raising fares need not request funds from the state to meet 
shortfalls caused by adverse judgments.  See Bolden, 953 F.2d at 
819; Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 661.7  The Commission is authorized "to 
fix, and to revise, from time to time," tolls for the use of the 
Pennsylvania Turnpike System.  36 P.S. § 651.16(a).  In fact, the 
Commission's authority to set the toll rate "shall not be subject 
to supervision or regulation by any other State commission, 
board, bureau or agency."  Id. at § 651.16(b).  In light of 
Bolden and Fitchik, we think the Commission's power to raise 
revenue levels by increasing the toll rates, even in the absence 
of information regarding the Commission's financial condition and 
consequent ability to pay a judgment against it, supports the 
view that the Commission need not seek assistance from the state 
to satisfy a judgment against it. 
 3.  Whether the Sovereign has Immunized Itself 
 The Act provides that "[a]ll compensation and salaries 
and all expenses incurred in carrying out the provisions of this 
                     
7
.   We also noted in Fitchik, alternatively, that the entity 
could cover a shortfall by reducing its expenses or capital 
budget.  Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 661.  Similarly, the Commission 
would, we imagine, be able to cover a shortfall by reducing its 
expenses or capital budget.  
  
act shall be paid solely from funds provided under the authority 
of this act . . . ."  36 P.S. § 651.8(a).  Furthermore, the Act 
provides that all bonds, notes and other obligations issued by 
the Commission under the Act 
 shall not be deemed to be a debt of the 
Commonwealth or a pledge of the faith and 
credit of the Commonwealth, but such bonds, 
notes or other obligations shall be payable 
solely from the revenues of the commission 
. . . .  All such bonds, notes or other 
obligations shall contain a statement on 
their face that the Commonwealth is not 
obligated to pay the same or the interest 
thereon except from revenues of the 
commission . . . and that the faith and 
credit of the Commonwealth is not pledged to 
the payment of the principal or interest of 
such bonds, notes or other obligations.  The 
issuance of turnpike revenue bonds, notes or 
other obligations under the provisions of 
this act shall not directly or indirectly or 
contingently obligate the Commonwealth to 
levy or to pledge any form of taxation 
whatever therefor or to make any 
appropriation for their payment. 
36 P.S. § 651.4. 
 The Commission observes that the General Assembly of 
Pennsylvania has not expressly immunized the state from 
responsibility for all of the Commission's possible debts and 
liabilities.  Nowhere in the Commission's original or subsequent 
enabling acts, the Commission notes, is there a provision 
disclaiming Pennsylvania's responsibility for the Commission's 
unassumed liabilities and obligations.  One can imagine, the 
Commission suggests, numerous situations in which the Commission 
would face unassumed liabilities or debts large enough to exhaust 
  
the Commission's funds and necessitate the Commission's rescue by 
the Commonwealth. 
 In light of our case law, we do not agree that the 
absence of a blanket disclaimer is significant.  What is 
significant under our case law is the fact that the Commission 
has failed to establish that Pennsylvania is under any 
affirmative obligation to pay the Commission's unassumed 
liabilities in the first place.  See Bolden, 953 F.2d at 819 ("A 
state legislature might feel compelled as a practical matter to 
subsidize a variety of entities that provide necessary services, 
including financially pressed municipalities.  Such discretionary 
subsidies committed in reaction to a judgment, however, would not 
necessarily transform the recipients into alter egos of the 
state.").  Although the Commonwealth might well choose to 
appropriate money to the Commission to enable it to meet a 
shortfall caused by an adverse judgment, such voluntary payments 
by a state simply "`do not trigger [Eleventh Amendment] 
immunity.'"  Id. (quoting Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 661).8 
                     
8
.   Christy contends that the Commission is able to self-insure 
and to purchase liability insurance, and that the Commission in 
fact self-insures at least part of its contingent liabilities 
under the Commonwealth's Employee Liability Self-Insurance 
Program.  We have in cases past considered an entity's ability to 
obtain insurance as evidence of that entity's financial self-
sufficiency and independence from the state.  See Bolden, 953 
F.2d at 819; Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 661.  The Commission counters 
that the alleged fact of the Commission's self-insurance is not 
in evidence noting that "[n]o record reference is offered [by 
Christy], nor does any affidavit, deposition excerpt, or document 
included in the record support this statement."  (Commission 
reply at 19 n.14).  But the Commission overlooks the fact that it 
bears the burden of proving entitlement to Eleventh Amendment 
immunity; its failure to provide evidence of an inability to 
  
 The Commission has failed to establish that (1) a 
judgment against it would be tantamount to a judgment against the 
Treasury of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; (2) the Commission 
lacks financial resources sufficient to pay a potential judgment 
against it; or (3) Pennsylvania would be under any obligation to 
cover any such potential judgment against the Commission.  
Accordingly, on the record as it stands before us, the funding 
factor, the most important of the three, weighs heavily in 
support of the conclusion that the Commission is not an arm of 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and does not enjoy Eleventh 
Amendment immunity from suit in federal court.          
 B.  Status at State Law 
 The second general factor we must consider in 
determining whether the Commission is an arm or alter ego of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is the status of the Commission 
under Pennsylvania law.  Our purpose here is to determine whether 
Pennsylvania law treats the Commission as an independent entity, 
or as a surrogate for the state.  See Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 662. 
 In Specter v. Commonwealth, 341 A.2d 481 (1975), a 
plurality of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the 
Commission is not an arm of the Commonwealth and not entitled to 
sovereign immunity.  After examining the legislative acts 
creating the Commission and defining its purposes and powers, as 
(..continued) 
obtain insurance is our primary concern, not Christy's failure to 
cite record evidence to the contrary.  
  
well as judicial decisions in which the Commission's status was 
at issue, the court explained that: 
 There is, of course, no doubt that the 
Commonwealth itself could have constructed 
the Turnpike in the same manner that it 
constructs and operates its State highways.  
Had it done so, the State's immunity from 
suit would encompass actions arising in 
connection with the Turnpike.  But the 
Commonwealth itself did not build this 
highway and does not maintain it.  The 
legislature created this separate body and at 
the same time disclaimed any responsibility 
on the part of the Commonwealth for 
liabilities which it, the Commission, might 
incur.  It is clear that the Commission is 
not an integral part of the Commonwealth, and 
cannot share the attributes of sovereignty 
which inhere in the state.  It follows that 
the Commission is not immune from suit in 
tort for the acts of its servants and agents 
acting in the course of their employment or 
agency. 
Id. at 491 (emphasis in original). 
 The Commission does, we recognize, possess certain 
attributes associated with sovereignty.  For example, the 
Commission (1) may exercise the power of eminent domain; see 36 
P.S. §§ 651.9 - .11; (2) enjoys statutory immunity from suit in 
state court; see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8522(a); and (3) is exempt from 
all state property taxation; see 36 P.S. § 651.15.  On the other 
hand, the Commission possesses certain traits not at all 
characteristic of an arm of the state; for example, the 
Commission may sue and be sued in its own name; see 36 P.S. 
§ 651.7(a)(3); and has the power to enter into contracts in its 
own name; see 36 P.S. § 651.7(a)(2). 
  
 On balance, the "status under state law" factors weigh 
slightly in favor of the conclusion that the Commission is not an 
arm of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  This is true, 
especially in light of the plurality holding of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court in Specter that the Commission is not an integral 
part of the Commonwealth, and thus cannot share the attributes of 
sovereignty which inhere in the state.  Cf. Peters, 16 F.3d at 
1351 (holding that the Delaware River Port Authority's status 
under state law weighs in favor of the conclusion that the agency 
does not enjoy sovereign immunity, especially in light of a 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court case holding that the DRPA is not "`an 
integral part of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania'" (citation 
omitted)). 
 The Commission contends that in enacting Pennsylvania's 
sovereign immunity statute, see 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 8501 et seq., the 
Pennsylvania legislature "conclusively repudiated" Specter's 
conclusion that the Commission is separate and apart from the 
Commonwealth.  The Commission further notes that in two 
unanimous, post-Specter, decisions, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth 
Court confirmed that the Commission enjoys sovereign immunity.  
See Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Jellig, 563 A.2d 202 
(Pa.Cmwlth. 1989); Bradley v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 
550 A.2d 261 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1988).  To accord Specter any deference, 
the Commission argues, is to give Specter value already taken 
away by the Pennsylvania legislature and judiciary. 
 We do not share the Commission's appraisal of Specter's 
continued vitality.  Passage of the Pennsylvania sovereign 
  
immunity statute has not diminished the significance of Specter's 
analysis to our assessment of the Commission's claim of 
entitlement to Eleventh Amendment immunity.  By enacting an 
immunity statute pursuant to which the Commission is accorded 
sovereign immunity, the Pennsylvania legislature did not 
"conclusively repudiate" Specter's conclusion that the Commission 
is not an integral part of the Commonwealth and does not share 
the attributes of sovereignty inhering in the state.  In enacting 
the sovereign immunity statute, the Pennsylvania legislature 
merely conferred upon entities such as the Commission by way of 
statute that which they otherwise lacked, namely, immunity from 
suit in state court.  We implied as much in Toombs v. Manning, 
835 F.2d 453 (3d Cir. 1987), in which we explained that 
 [t]he significance to our analysis of the 
legislature's inclusion of the . . . 
Commission as an immune agency is that it is 
clear that the General Assembly intended to 
provide sovereign immunity protection not 
only for those entities which before Mayle[ 
v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 388 
A.2d 709 (1978) (in which the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court abrogated sovereign immunity)] 
had been immune as sovereigns, but also for 
those entities not previously immune, but 
which now came within the statute's scope. 
Toombs, 835 F.2d at 459 (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied).  
Nor do Jellig and Bradley undermine the continuing validity of 
Specter's analysis.  In those cases, the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court merely applied the Pennsylvania sovereign 
immunity statute to find, unremarkably, that the Commission 
  
enjoys sovereign immunity from suit in state court.  See Jellig, 
563 A.2d at 205; Bradley, 550 A.2d at 263.9         
 C.  Autonomy 
 The Commission's membership is controlled by the 
executive and legislative branches of the Commonwealth.  One 
member of the five-person Commission must always be the Secretary 
of Transportation, a cabinet-level position appointed by the 
Governor and confirmed by the Pennsylvania Senate.  See 36 P.S. 
§§ 651.5(d), 652d; see also 71 P.S. § 67.1(d)(1) (Gubernatorial 
appointment and senatorial confirmation of Secretary of 
Transportation).  The four remaining Commission members are also 
appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate.  See 36 
P.S. §§ 651.5(b), 652d; see also 71 P.S. § 67.1(c)(2) 
                     
9
.   We recognize that the Pennsylvania sovereign immunity 
statute itself is some evidence of the Commission's status before 
the law of Pennsylvania.  And as some evidence of the 
Commission's status at state law, it is relevant to our Eleventh 
Amendment inquiry.  However, it is far from determinative of that 
inquiry.  We have explained that state law extending sovereign 
immunity to an agency is "relevant to the Eleventh Amendment 
determination, but it is not dispositive."  Bolden, 953 F.2d at 
815 n.8 (citations omitted). 
 
  Thus, a state law determination of sovereign 
immunity may coincide with and influence the 
federal law determination of Eleventh 
Amendment status, but the former does not 
conclusively determine the latter . . . .  
[Otherwise], each state legislature 
apparently could confer Eleventh Amendment 
protection on any entity it wished, including 
counties and cities, by enacting a statute 
clothing these entities with "sovereign 
immunity" from suit on state claims. 
 
Id. at 815 n.8, 817.  
  
(Gubernatorial appointment and senatorial confirmation of 
Commission members).  State authority over the appointment of 
Commission members lends obvious support to a finding of 
sovereignty.  See Peters, 16 F.3d at 1351-52. 
 On the other hand, weighing in favor of a finding of 
autonomy are the facts that the Commission may fix and revise 
tolls; enter contracts in its own name; issue bonds and notes; 
sue in its own name; purchase and own property; and promulgate 
rules and regulations for its own governance.  See 36 P.S. 
§ 651.16 (fix and revise tolls); 36 P.S. § 651.7 (enter 
contracts, sue in its own name, purchase and own property, and 
promulgate rules and regulations for its own governance); 36 P.S. 
§ 651.12 (issue bonds and notes).  Of course, several of these 
powers are subject to a degree of state control.  For example, 
the Pennsylvania Attorney General must review the form and 
legality of each contract and rule or regulation the Commission 
proposes.  See 71 P.S. § 732-204(b) (review of rules and 
regulations); 71 P.S. § 732-204(f) (review of contracts).  
Moreover, Commission issuance of bonds and notes is subject to 
state approval.  See 36 P.S. § 652u.1 
 On balance, the significant control the Commonwealth 
exercises through the power to appoint all the members of the 
Commission weighs slightly in favor of Commission immunity from 
suit.  Cf. Peters, 16 F.3d at 1351-52 (where separately 
incorporated agency was found to have power to enter contracts, 
hold property, and set and collect tolls, we held that the 
autonomy factor weighed "slightly" in favor of affording immunity 
  
in light of the states' power to appoint the members of the board 
of the agency in question). 
 D.  The Totality of Factors 
 Having considered each of the three factors above, we 
now must consider the three factors in their totality.  See 
Bolden, 953 F.2d at 821.  Since the most important factor, 
funding, weighs heavily against the Commission and only one 
factor weighs, even slightly, in favor of the Commission, the 
balance is clearly struck against a finding that the Commission 
enjoys sovereign immunity as an arm of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania.  Consequently, we find that the Commission is 
subject to suit in federal court.  We will affirm the district 
court's conclusion to this effect. 
 IV.  Conclusion 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the 
district court's denial of the defendants' motions for summary 
judgment on Eleventh Amendment and qualified immunity grounds. 
________________________ 
 
 
 
